Detail The Contingent Governance of Teams : Analysis of Institutional Complementarity   Oleh:  Aoki, Masahiko Jenis: Article from Bulletin/Magazine Dalam koleksi: INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW vol. 35 no. 3 (1994), page 657-676. Topik: GOVERNANCE; contingent governance; teams; institutional complementarity Ketersediaan Perpustakaan Pusat (Semanggi) Nomor Panggil: II49.4 Non-tandon: 1 (dapat dipinjam: 0) Tandon: tidak ada     Lihat Detail Induk Isi artikel The first purpose of this paper is to design a model of governance structure, called the contingent governance, which can control the free - riding problem in teams in the second - best manner. The second is to show, by a new method of comparative static analysis, that the effectiveness of the contingent governance may be enhanced by complementary institutional arrangements of the imperfect labor market and bank - centered financial system. The paper discusses the implications of such institutional complementarity for the dynamic change of the Japanese main bank system and financial system design of transitional economies. Opini Anda Klik untuk menuliskan opini Anda tentang koleksi ini! Kembali

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