Detail Last One Out Wins : Trade Policy in An International Exit Game   Oleh:  Brainard, S. Lael Jenis: Article from Bulletin/Magazine Dalam koleksi: INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW vol. 35 no. 1 (1994), page 151-172. Topik: trade policy; last out; wins; international exit game Ketersediaan Perpustakaan Pusat (Semanggi) Nomor Panggil: II49.4 Non-tandon: 1 (dapat dipinjam: 0) Tandon: tidak ada     Lihat Detail Induk Isi artikel This paper examines the effect of intervention on the order and timing of exit in an international industry with fixed costs and declining demand. A dynamic inconsistency problem arises when policymakers are unable to precommit : they always intervene to prolong the life of the local firm, even when this is not socially optimal. The effect of tariff intervention is in all cases to terminate production prematurely, and in many cases to reverse the order of exit. Intervention in the absence of precommitment is never first best, and actually reduces welfare when the differential between firms' fixed costs is large. Opini Anda Klik untuk menuliskan opini Anda tentang koleksi ini! Kembali

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