Soft Budget Constraints, Taxes and The Incentives to Cooperate  

Oleh:

Aizenman, Joshua

Jenis: Article from Bulletin/Magazine
Dalam koleksi: INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW vol. 34 no. 4 (1993), page 819-832.
Topik: budgets; soft budget constraints; taxes; incentives; cooperate

Ketersediaan

Perpustakaan Pusat (Semanggi) Nomor Panggil: II49.3 Non-tandon: 1 (dapat dipinjam: 0) Tandon: tidak ada

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Isi artikel

This paper applies the tacit coordination framework to the political macroeconomic context. The macroeconomic equilibrium is the outcome of an administration, consisting of a large number of decision makers whose horizon, being endogenously determined by their behavior, is uncertain. The public imposes a degree of discipline on the policy makers by its option to replace the administration, and the administration imposes discipline on the policy makers by monitoring their effective expenditure. Adverse shocks or a shorter horizon are shown to reduce cooperation among policy makers and increase the inflation rate and the use of discretionary taxes.

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