Detail Costly Price Adjustment and Strategic Firm Interaction   Oleh:  Bernhardt, Dan Jenis: Article from Bulletin/Magazine Dalam koleksi: INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW vol. 34 no. 3 (1993), page 525-548. Topik: prices; costly price adjustment; strategic firm interaction Ketersediaan Perpustakaan Pusat (Semanggi) Nomor Panggil: II49.3 Non-tandon: 1 (dapat dipinjam: 0) Tandon: tidak ada     Lihat Detail Induk Isi artikel This paper details the implications of costly price adjustment for strategic firm interaction and the time series of prices. Such frictions introduce multiple equilibrium strategies which, in turn, help facilitate collusion among firms. Collusive opportunities improve as product differentiation increases or markets become less competitive. Collusion may or may not increase profits depending on whether the equilibrium selection is the most profitable subgame perfect equilibrium, or the renegotiation proof equilibrium. Independent of the equilibrium selection, strategic incentives exist for firms to adjust prices in concert, and to be more responsive to shocks which lead to increased prices. Opini Anda Klik untuk menuliskan opini Anda tentang koleksi ini! Kembali

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