Inducing Efficiency : Externalities, Missing Markets, and The Coase Theorem  

Oleh:

Bigelow, John Payne

Jenis: Article from Bulletin/Magazine
Dalam koleksi: INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW vol. 34 no. 2 (1993), page 335-346.
Topik: efficiency; efficiency; externalities; markets; coase theorem

Ketersediaan

Perpustakaan Pusat (Semanggi) Nomor Panggil: II49.3 Non-tandon: 1 (dapat dipinjam: 0) Tandon: tidak ada

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Isi artikel

The capacity of side - payments to induce an efficient outcome, as predicted by the "Coase Theorem," is studied. Side - payments are formally introduced in a bimatrix game involving externalities, and the resulting equilibrium is called an induced equilibrium. When induced equilibria exist they weakly Pareto - dominate a Nash equilibrium of the original game without side - payments. When, because of externalities, one market is missing, an induced equilibrium always exists, is uniquely valued, and is Pareto - efficient. When more than one market is missing, induced equilibria may not exist, may be Pareto - inefficient, and may be Pareto ranked.

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