Debt, Futures and Options : Optimal Price-Linked Financial Contracts Under Moral Hazard and Limited Liability  

Oleh:

Innes, Robert

Jenis: Article from Bulletin/Magazine
Dalam koleksi: INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW vol. 34 no. 2 (1993), page 271-296.
Topik: DEBT; debt; futures; financial contracts; moral hazard; liability

Ketersediaan

Perpustakaan Pusat (Semanggi) Nomor Panggil: II49.3 Non-tandon: 1 (dapat dipinjam: 0) Tandon: tidak ada

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Isi artikel

This paper characterizes the optimal financial contract between a risk neutral entrepreneur and risk neutral lender / investors when the entrepreneur has limited liability, there is moral hazard, and the investor payoff function can depend on both output and output price, but is nondecreasing in output. In this setting, the optimal contract is a price - contingent commodity bond which can be replicated by combining pure debt, commodity futures and commodity call option contracts. Although a pure commodity bond contract is sometimes optimal, a pure debt contract is almost never optimal. Various properties of the entrepreneur's optimal price - contingent promised payment are described.

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